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NOTES
LICENSE REVOCATION: UNCERTAINTY AND DUE PROCESS
Under state and federal due process, language of the law which is
vague and uncertain will render a statute void for indefiniteness., The
sections of the California Business and Professions Code dealing with
suspension and revocation of licenses contain many questionable words
and phrases. Some examples are "dishonesty,"2 "deceptive advertising,"3
"moral turpitude,"4 "incompetence,"5 "gross immorality,"6 "immoral con-
duct,"7 "not of a good character,"" and "of questioned financial responsi-
bility."" One or more of these catchall phrases appears in practically every
statute dealing with cause for suspension or revocation of a license. 10
Judicial review of disciplinary action of licensing boards almost invariably
includes a ruling on the plea that language under which the licensee
was "convicted" is too vague and uncertain."
The cases abound with references to the propositions that the right
to practice one's profession is property of the highest character, and that
'For discussions of the void-for-vagueness doctrine see Comment, 41 CALF. L.
REV. 523 (1953); Note, 62 HAnv. L. REv. 77 (1948). For a general background on
licensing statutes, their development, scope, and constitutionality see CouNci. OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, OccuPATONAL LICENSING IN THE UNrrED STATES (1952); GELLHORN,
NDVIDuAL FREEDOM AND GoV MENT RESTRAINT (1956); Monaghan, The Constitu-
tion and Occupational Licensing in Massachusetts, 41 B.U.L. REv. 157 (1961); Com-
ment, 14, STAN. L. REv. 533 (1962).
2 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 5100(d) (accountants); 7553.2 (private detectives);
8954(j) (yacht and ship brokers).
3 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2380 (physicians); 1680(11) (dentists); 6579 (bar-
bers); 7693 (funeral directors).
4 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 1679 (dentists); 2383 (physicians); 2761(f) (nurses);
1320(a) (clinical laboratory technicians); 5100(a) (accountants); 7431(j) (cosme-
tologists).
5 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2761(a) (1) (nurses); 3093 (optometrists).
3 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 1680(8) (dentists).
7 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6582 (barbers).
8 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6775(b) (professional engineers); 9540.3 (cleaners
and dyers).
9 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 9547 (cleaners and dyers).
10 For a discussion of the various types of prohibited conduct subjecting the violator
to license revocation, see Note, 44 CAL. L. REv. 403 (1956).
"That the problem of vagueness in licensing statutes is of current significance in
California is indicated by the fact that five of the cases to be subsequently noted in this
paper have reached the appellate courts within the last four years: Rhodes v. Savage,
219 A.C.A. 359, 32 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1963); Duskin v. State Bd. of Dry Cleaners, 58
Cal. 2d 155, 23 Cal. Rptr. 404, 373 P.2d 4-8 (1962); Wayne v. Bureau of Private
Investigators, 201 Cal. App. 2d 427, 20 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1962); McMurtry v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 180 Cal. App. 2d 760, 4 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1960); Board of Educ. v.
Weiland, 179 Cal. App. 2d 808, 4 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1960). It is also reported that more
often than not accusations filed against licensees include a charge of violation of various
catchall phrases such as are listed in the text at notes 2-9 supra. Interview with a
hearing officer, State of California, Department of Professional and Vocational Stand-
ards, San Francisco, November 1963.
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where licensing is involved the requirements of due process are strictly
enforced. 12 But these principles are opposed by the equally honored rule
that the constitutionality of a statute is to be upheld if at all possible.-3
While it is proper for courts to show restraint in striking down legislative
enactments, this restraint should not cause the court to lose sight of the
other side of the issue before it, namely, "property" rights. Moreover, this
self-imposed limitation, coupled with the present volume of litigation on
this subject suggests the need for continuous legislative re-examination of
the various statutes with an eye toward greater clarity and precision of
meaning.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is easily stated but its application is
far from predictable. One of the most quoted statements is that "[A] stat-
ute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process
of law."14 More specifically, the statutory language must satisfy two cri-
teria: (1) it must provide an intelligible standard of conduct for the person
to whom it applies so that he may be sufficiently warned of the forbidden
or required conduct,15 and (2) the courts must be given a standard or
guide against which conduct may be uniformly judged.' 6 The distinction
between the requirements is not a useful one, for a court is not likely to
say that it can interpret language which the respondent could not, and
certainly the converse would never be applied.
In searching-for the meaning of statutory language, the courts (and
presumably the respondent) refer to accepted common law definitions,
legislative history and intent, common usage, usage known and accepted
by members of the class governed, and court decisions which have con-
strued the language.17 Such a search for meaning may be possible in a
12 See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959); Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915);
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121 (1888); Cavassa v. Off, 206 Cal. 307, 314,
274 Pac. 523, 526 (1929).
3 3 Downey v. Watson, 114 Cal. App. 2d 491, 495, 250 P.2d 692, 694 (1952). A
typical statement of this *principle is found in People v. Nunn, 46 Cal. 2d 460, 468, 296
P.2d 813, 818 (1956): "A liberal construction should be given to constitutional pro-
visions in order to sustain legislative enactments, and all doubts or uncertainties arising
from the Constitution, as well as the statute, should be ruled in favor of the validity of
the statute."
14Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); accord, Perez v.
Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 728, 198 P.2d 17, 27 (1948); People v. Saad, 105 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 851, 854, 234 P.2d 785, 787 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1951).
15 In Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951), the Court commented on
the void-for-vagueness doctrine as follows: "Impossible standards of specificity are not
required.... The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as
to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices."
16 In re Newburn, 53 Cal. 2d 786, 796-97, 3 Cal. Rptr. 364, 371, 350 P.2d 116,
123 (1960); People v. McCaughan, 49 Cal. 2d 409, 414, 317 P.2d 974, 977 (1957);
Comment, 41 CALir. L. R-v. 523 (1953).
27 McMurtry v. Board of Medical Examiners, 180 Cal. App. 2d 760, 4 Cal. Rptr.
910 (1960).
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courtroom but cannot seriously be expected of "men of common intelli-
gence"; thus it must follow that the test is whether a sufficient guide to
adjudication is set forth in the statute. With statutes involving occupa-
tional licensing perhaps the courts would be better advised to direct their
inquiry to whether the language conveys a sufficiently clear warning of
the required or prohibited conduct since here is a subject which a business
or professional man will make an effort to know so that he may be sure
that his conduct does not fall outside the legal requirements. The knowl-
edge that he has erred is of little value to the licensee when gained only
upon the imposition of a disciplinary penalty which jeopardizes his liveli-
hood; and this must be the result when cases are decided on an ad hoc
basis, under language which the courts themselves admit is incapable of
certainty of definition.' 8
The problem presented by questionable statutory language is best il-
lustrated by looking at judicial treatment of certain phrases found in the
disciplinary sections of the California Business and Professions Code.
In Duskin v. State Bd. of Dry Cleaners,9 a penalty had been assessed
against the licensee for failure to comply with the board's order to file a
surety bond to protect those with whom he dealt in the dry cleaning
business. Business and Professions Code section 9547 provides that if the
state board of dry cleaners should find that a licensees "financial respon-
sibility is questionable" he may be compelled to obtain such a bond. The
licensee argued that "questionable financial responsibility" was so vague
and uncertain a term that the section was void. The court in holding other-
wise, noted that this was a "general policy" type statute, wherein the
legislature need only set forth a general standard or yardstick and might
delegate authority to the administrative body to adopt and enforce rea-
sonable rules for effecting the purpose of the statute.2 0 Further, the court
found that the legislative intent, in speaking of "questionable financial
responsibility," was to describe a financial condition which created a sub-
38 See text at notes 23 and 26 infra.
1958 Cal. 2d 155, 23 Cal. Rptr. 404, 373 P.2d 468 (1962).
20 Other examples of general policy type statutes cited were those delegating au-
thority to regulate oil wells, milk prices, and to administer the "assigned risk" law
regarding automobile insurance. The standard required of these statutes is that the
discretion delegated to the board must not be used arbitrarily or amount to sanctions
which add to or change the intent of the statute; that is, the board may not determine
what the law is to be. El Dorado Oil Works v. McColgan, 34 Cal. 2d 731, 215 P.2d
4 (1950); American Distilling Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 55 Cal. App. 2d 799,
131 P.2d 609 (1942).
Opposed to this broad, policy-type statute are those described as self-executing
statutes, principally criminal in nature, but including the bulk of civil licensing statutes
where prohibited conduct is spelled out and enforced by the administrative board.
Here both the licensee and the licensing agency must be given a definite standard to
follow and enforce, while the policy-type statute allows a broad, general intent to be
made specific by regulations promulgated by the board. Nevertheless, an acceptable
standard for the self-executing statute seems to mean no more than a reasonably ade-
quate disclosure of legislative intent in language giving fair notice. In re Clark, 149
Cal. App. 2d 802, 309 P.2d 142 (1957).
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stantial risk to persons with whom the licensee might deal. This condition
might be evidenced by such factors as liens and bills payable which, in
the opinion of the board, create a substantial risk that customers might
suffer loss in dealing with the licensee. Under this statute it is the opinion
of the licensing board, as it investigates the finances of each licensee, that
adds the required certainty to the code section. Is this the certainty and
warning the licensee is entitled to?
The Business and Professions Code section dealing with suspension and
revocation of a private investigator's license 21 provides for discipline if
the licensee has "committed any act in the course of business constituting
dishonesty or fraud." In Wayne v. Bureau of Private Investigators2 the
petitioner was found guilty of misrepresenting the identity of his employer
to an adverse witness in order to extract testimony which would otherwise
have been withheld. The bureau had suspended the agent's license and his
appeal from the lower court's approval of the bureau's action was in part
based on the proposition that the word "dishonesty" was too vague and
uncertain. 23 The court held that the burden of proving vagueness rested
on the petitioner, that he had failed to sustain this burden, that the
statute was capable of reasonable and practical construction, and that it
would be impossible for the legislature to draft a statute which would
specifically set forth every act that might be considered "dishonest." A
case cited by the court for a definition of "dishonesty" construed it as
"bad faith, fraud, deception, betrayal, abuse of integrity."2 4 In another
recent case the suspension for "dishonesty" of a real estate agent was up-
held.2 5 The court noted that the term covers an infinite variety of situations,
and when used in licensing statutes the word "honesty" has the broadest
possible meaning; it requires "a fastidious allegiance" to the standards of
one's profession, "fairness," "straightforwardness of conduct," and "truth-
fulness."
In the light of these decisions it seems that all but the purest of acts
could be called "dishonest," and rather than attempting to keep the def-
inition within bounds the courts proceed on a case-to-case basis, paying
21 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 7553.2.
22201 Cal. App. 2d 427, 20 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1962).
23The petitioner did not question the meaning of the word "fraud," but the court
in Wayne nevertheless defined it: "Fraud embraces multifarious means whereby one
-person gains advantage over another and means in effect bad faith, dishonesty or
overreaching .... 'No definite and invariable rule can be laid down as a general prop-
osition defining fraud, as it includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and unfair
ways by which another is cheated."' Id. at 437-38, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 200-01, quoting
the last sentence from Wells v. Zenz, 83 Cal. App. 137, 140, 256 Pac. 484, 485 (1927).
It would seem that the word "fraud" is as vague as "dishonesty."
24 Hogg v. Real Estate Comm'r, 54 Cal. App. 2d 712, 717, 129 P.2d 709, 712
(1942).
25 Rhodes v. Savage, 219 A.C.A. 359, 32 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1963). Petitioner, real
estate agent for the seller, apparently abandoned negotiations with a particular buyer,
did not advise the seller, and conveyed another offer of the same buyer to the fore-
closing mortgagee of the seller's property.
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little heed to the requirement that a statute provide warning and establish
a standard of adjudication.
A similar judicial approach is seen where the charge is "unprofessional
conduct." The court in Board of Educ. v. Swan26 approved a teacher's dis-
missal, saying that the requirements of conduct of a school teacher are
so "intimate, delicate and the things in which a teacher might prove un-
worthy of are so numerous" 27 that they are incapable of enumeration in a
statute. In effect, the court said that the fact that "unprofessional conduct"
is not and cannot be defined does not render the phrase so uncertain as to
be declared void.
The treatment by California courts of the word "immoral" is partic-
ularly interesting in view of the fact that the United States Supreme Court
in Musser v. Utah28 held that a criminal conviction on a charge of com-
mitting "acts injurious to public morals" violated due process, unless the
statute was not as broad as it appeared on its face. The court felt that
to hold otherwise would permit conviction for almost any act which a
judge and jury might at the moment find contrary to their notion of what
was good for "health, morals, trade, commerce, justice or order."9 The
judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah was vacated, and the case re-
manded for a determination by that court of the scope of the statute.3 0
In State v. Musser3l the Utah court could find no legislative intent to limit
the words to other than their general meaning and struck down the statute,
concluding that acts which could be considered "injurious to public morals"
are as numerous as the opinions of man. 2
2841 Cal. 2d 546, 261 P.2d 261 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937 (1954).
Petitioner was charged with making derogatory statements about the Superintendent
of Schools and the Board of Education, had refused assignments, did not attend sched-
uled meetings and had excused her classes before the final bell on several occasions.
27 Id. at 553, 261 P.2d at 266.
28333 U.S. 95 (1948).
291d. at 97.
20 Uru CODE ANN., 1943, § 103-11-1, replaced by UTAH CODE ANN., 1953. Cf.
UTAH CODE A-N., 1953, § 76-12-1(5).
31118 Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193 (1950).
32California has a penal statute, CAL. PEN. CODE § 182(5), containing language
almost identical to the invalidated Utah statute. Defining "conspiracy," the statute
provides punishment for d combination of two or more persons who conspire "To
commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to pervert or obstruct
justice, or the due administration of the laws." The constitutionality of this entire
provision was questioned on the basis of Musser but was upheld in Davis v. Superior
Court, 175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 345 P.2d 513 (1959). The court held that three prior
California decisions, Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 49, 216 P.2d 859 (1950);
People v. Sullivan, 113 Cal. App. 2d 510, 248 P.2d 520 (1952); and Calhoun v.
Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 18, 291 P.2d 474 (1955), had illustrated and limited the
type of acts which would fall within this language, thus supplying the necessary def-
initeness to an otherwise vague and uncertain statute. But in Davis the charge con-
cerned only the last half of the statute dealing with obstructing justice and the due
administration of the law, as was the charge in the three 'imiting" cases cited by the
court. This leaves open in California the question of the vagueness of that portion of
the statutory language concerning "any act injurious ... to public morals . . ." which
the Musser decisions held void. PERKiNs, CamnxAL LAw, 538-44 (1957).
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A year before Musser v. Utah the Louisiana Supreme Court, in State
v. Truby,33 held void for vagueness a statute which-made it a misdemeanor
to keep a house for "immoral purposes"; the court adopted the theory,
which later was to prevail in Musser, that the rulings of courts and juries
would vary from locality to locality, with no standard for determining
what would or would not be a house used for an "immoral purpose."
Subsequently the California Supreme Court in Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf
Club,34 citing Truby with approval, indicated that "of lewd or immoral
character" is too vague a description of a person to withstand due process
requirements. Nevertheless, the court upheld a statute permitting exclusion
of undesirables from race tracks on the grounds that it was not a customer's
general moral character that the legislature intended to open for inspection
but his observable conduct at the track. Thus the court avoided the effect
of Truby by limiting the scope of the statute.35
To illustrate the vague and all-inclusive nature of the word "immoral," the
court in Orloff referred to Words and Phrases.38 Two years later, in a crim-
inal case,37 the court cited this definition in holding that the word "immoral"
was not vague or uncertain where it appeared in a statute dealing with
contributing to the delinquency of a minor.38 Apparently the Musser cases
were not considered, and the court used the same definition that had been
used in Orloff to illustrate the vagueness of the term, as authority for its
acceptability. Subsequently, in a civil disciplinary proceeding, this same
definition from Orloff was again used to uphold the words "immoral con-
duct." 9 Thus the California courts, through a questionable evolutionary
process, have taken a word considered too vague and uncertain by the
United States Supreme Court, defined it in a most unlimited sense and
found it to be acceptable in both penal and civil statutes.
33211 La. 178, 29 So. 2d 758 (1947).
84 36 Cal. 2d 742, 740, 227 P.2d 449, 454 (1953).
35 Two of the justices dissented from this distinction between "immoral" acts on
the premises as opposed to "immoral" acts off the premises, saying that observation of
a person's conduct would not add the required certainty to the word, since the conclu-
sion that a particular act was "immoral" would necessarily vary from one observer to
the next. Id. at 744, 227 P.2d at 456.
36 "The term 'immoral' has been defined generally as that which is hostile to the
welfare of the general public and contrary to good morals. Immorality has not been
confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative
of corruption, indecency, depravity, dissoluteness; or as wilful, flagrant, or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to the opinions of respectable members of the
community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and the public welfare.
(Words & Phrases, Perm. ed. vol. 20, pp. 159-160.)" 36 Cal. 2d at 740,227 P.2d at 453. Cf.
20 WORDS & PmAsEs 226-28 (1959).
37 People v. Deibert, 117 Cal. App. 2d 410, 419, 256 P.2d 355, 361 (1953).
38 The statute provided that it was a misdemeanor for a person to cause or encourage
any person under 21 to lead "an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life ... .. Cal. Stat.
1915, ch. 631, § 21, p. 1246 referring to Cal Stat. 1915, ch. 631, § 1, p. 1225 (now
CAL. PmN. CODE § 272 referring to C.L. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601).
39 Board of Educ. v. Weiland, 179 Cal. App. 2d 808, 4 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1960)
(teacher discharged for "immoral conduct" for padding evening school enrollment to
prevent its cancellation).
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"Moral turpitude" is another phrase that apparently has created little
difficulty in the California courts with respect to vagueness and uncer-
tainty.40 Yet it has been defined as "everything done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals."4 ' A discussion of the uncertainty inherent
in these words is found in Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Jordan
v. De George.42 Justice Jackson's point was that the words "acts injurious
to public morals" are too vague, as held in Musser, and the phrase "moral
turpitude" is not less uncertain. This dissenting opinion was cited with
approval by the Court in Konigsberg v. State Bar4 3 in considering the
words "good moral character" as found in the requirements for admission
to the California bar.44 The Court noted that the term "good moral char-
acter" might serve a useful purpose in licensing statutes but of itself was
"unusually ambigious."45 It could be defined in an infinite number of ways
and all definitions would necessarily reflect the attitudes, experiences and
prejudices of the definer. "Such a vague qualification, easily adapted to
personal views and predilections, can be a dangerous instrument for arbi-
trary and discriminatory denial of the right to practice law."46 Konigsberg
was such a case: the only apparent basis for the examiners' rejection of
the applicant was doubtful testimony that he had been present fifteen
years earlier at Communist Party meetings, criticisms he had made in
newspaper editorials regarding public officials, and his refusal to answer
questions regarding his political beliefs. Konigsberg was at all times willing
to sign an oath to uphold the Constitution. In ruling in Konigsberg's favor
on this point the court did not hold that the words "good moral character"
were too vague but found as a matter of fact that the bar examiners erred
in finding that Konigsberg lacked "good moral character."47
Conclusion
The preceding discussion indicates that a licensee has little chance to
obtain a reversal in California or in the Supreme Court of the United States
by urging the theory of vagueness and uncertainty of statutory language.
This is not to say that the appellant cannot be successful. The contention
40 Lorenz v. Board of Medical Examiners, 46 Cal. 2d 684, 290 P.2d 79 (1956)
(giving liquor to minor not of itself crime involving moral turpitude); Brainard v.
Board of Medical Examiners, 68 Cal. App. 2d 591, 157 P.2d 7 (1945) (conviction for
not keeping proper narcotics records a crime involving moral turpitude).
41Wallis v. State Bar, 21 Cal. 2d 322, 327, 131 P.2d 531, 534 (1942).
42 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) (deportation).
44 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6060(c).
43 353 U.S. 252 (1957). The case again came before the court, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
45 353 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1956).
46 Ibid.
17 See also Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) where a New York
statute providing for revocation of a license for conviction of a crime was held not to
be vague or uncertain merely because the act complained of (conviction in the District
of Columbia for failing to produce papers before a congressional committee) was not
a crime in New York.
NOTES
has been accepted on occasion with respect to license revocation."8 On the
other hand, attack on criminal statutes containing similar language is more
successful. 49 The relationship between civil and criminal statutes which
use questionable phrases is not clear. The United States Supreme Court
has said that a greater degree of certainty is required in criminal than in
civil statutes.50 And in Wayne v. Bureau of Private Investigators51 the court
stated that the words "dishonesty" and "fraud" in licensing statutes could
cover a greater variety of situations than in criminal statutes. Yet the courts
seem to pass back and forth between civil and criminal statutes without
reference to any difference in the degree of certainty. This has already
been pointed out in the evolution of the cases treating "immoral," where
definition of the word was interchanged. 52 Another illustration is the civil
case53 which, in stating the scope of the certainty requirement, quoted the
standard from a criminal case,54 while this criminal case had in turn quoted
a prior civil case.55 Because of the difference in the nature of the two
types of action (criminal confinement as opposed to discipline in regard
to a license) perhaps there should be a different standard of certainty ap-
plied. But to attempt to define the same word one way in a criminal
statute and another in a civil statute can lead only to confusion. This does
not mean, however, that a word found too vague to sustain a criminal
statute could not be sufficiently definite under the less stringent civil standard.
Yet it could be argued that taking away one's livelihood by revoking
or suspending his license is as serious an action by a state as incarcerating
a person for short periods of time under a misdemeanor statute.50 At least
one of the purposes of imposing a criminal penalty is to protect the public.
The practitioner's license is also revoked to protect the public. It would
not seem to follow that in the name of public protection a licensee should
be restrained under language requirements which would leave the criminal
unrestrained. Thus a licensee might well urge that the same standard of cer-
tainty, the more strict standard, should be applied to the licensing statutes.
The ultimate solution rests not with the courts but with the legislature.
It should not be the function of the courts to correct marginal language
in a state's code books. And the mere fact that marginal statutory language
has survived attack in the courts does not mean that the language should
not be revised. Responsibility properly rests with the legislative branch.
The California legislature has been aware of the need for constant
re-examination of licensing statutes. With the founding in 1953 of the
4 8 E.g., Hewitt v. Board of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 84 Pac. 39 (1906);
McMurtry v. Board of Medical Examiners, 180 Cal. App. 2d 760, 4 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1960).
49E.g., In re Newburn, 53 Cal. 2d 786, 3 Cal. Rptr. 364, 350 P.2d 116 (1960);
People v. McCaughan, 49 Cal. 2d 409, 317 P.2d 974 (1957).
50 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
51201 Cal. App. 2d 427, 20 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1962), supra note 22.
52 See text at notes 37, 39 supra.
53 McMurtry v. Board of Medical Examiners, 180 Cal. App. 2d 760, 766, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 910, 913 (1960).
54 People v. McCaughan, 49 Cal. 2d 409, 414, 317 P.2d 974, 977 (1957).
55 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
56 See Cavassa v. Off, 206 Cal. 307, 314, 274 Pac. 523, 526 (1929).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15
Feb., 1964N
Senate Interim Committee on Licensing of Business and Professions,' an
intensive program was begun, embracing hearings, recommendations, and
proposed legislation regarding the various licensed occupations. 5 A wide
variety of matters were brought before the committee, including requests
by various occupational groups for license status,5 9 for reorganization of
groups already licensed,60 and for additions and deletions to statutes in
effect.ei During the years 1955 to 1957 many changes were made in dis-
ciplinary statutes in an effort to relate conduct to be condemned to the
licensee's practice of his profession.62 This was a desirable step forward
since activities of a licensee having no bearing on his ability to perform his
occupation should not be the proper concern of a licensing board. In addi-
tion to this action, obsolete language was deleted from some statutes and
clarifying language added to others.6 3 That the committee was aware of
the need for a definite standard of conduct for the licensee to follow
and the board to admimster is illustrated by the proposal,6" subsequently
adopted,65 to repeal a provision for discipline based on "any unfair or
unjust practice, method or dealing which in the judgment of the board
may justify such action."66 But improvements were made in only some of
the statutes, and the discussion in this note should indicate that additional
work remains to be done.
Should causes for discipline be narrowly described to obtain certainty,
with the possibility that the calculating licensee could evade and circum-
5 7 Senate Resolution 112, 3 SENATE JoURNAL 4124 (June 10, 1953). Although this
committee no longer exists, its operations have recently been included as a function of
the Senate Fact Finding Committee on Business and Commerce.
58 1955 and 1957 REPoRTs To THE [CA aoRNu] IEGisLA-urx nY THE SENATE
IwEnum Cominrrr ON LiCENSiNG OF BusinEss AND PROFESSIONS, hereinafter cited
as 1955 REPORT and 1957 REPORT.
59 E.g., 1955 REPORT 86 and 1957 REPORT 37 (recommended against licensing
building designers); 1955 REPORT 96 (recommended against licensure of naturopathy);
1955 REPORT 148 (despite recommendation by the committee against licensure, a pro-
vision for certification of psychologists was passed by the legislature in 1957, CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2900-84, Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 2320 § 1, pp. 4037-46).60 E.g., 1955 REPORT 96 (nursing).
61 Appendices to the reports summarize the numerous legislative proposals by this
committee.6 2 An example of this legislation is found in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6775(a).
Previously, disciplinary action could be taken against a licensee "who has been con-
victed of a felony." As a result of the committee's recommendation this language was
changed by amendment in 1957 to one "who has been convicted of a felony ansing
from or in connection with the practice of engineering. "Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1708,
§ 2, p. 3082.
63 For example CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6577 provided discipline for a barber
found guilty of "malpractice and incompetency." This section was repealed m 1957 on the
recommendation of the committee since no licensee had ever been disciplined under the
language and no definition of what would constitute "malpractice" in barbering could
be furnished to the committee. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 915, § 2, p. 2123. 1957 REPORT
31, 35.
64 1957 REPORT 57.
65 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7431, Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1711, § 5, p. 3086.
66 Cal. Stat. 1953, ch. 1403, § 2, p. 2997, repealed.
NOTES
